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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A

ll people in South Africa have constitutionallyguaranteed language rights. To what extent do these
rights apply to non-citizens and are they actually
observed by various state departments and officials? This
report presents the results of a preliminary investigation
into this question by focusing on the rights and treatment of foreigners in
South Africa, particularly foreigners from other African countries.
The report was commissioned by the Southern African Migration
Project (SAMP) as part of a broader programme to understand the
reception and treatment of non-South Africans in the new South Africa.
Our aim, as authors, is to encourage government departments and nongovernmental organisations (NGO’s) to continue to work towards
policies which enhance the guarantee of multilingualism enshrined in
the Constitution, and which enable marginalised constituencies to be
recognised and heard.
The report focuses on the national departments of Home Affairs,
Safety and Security, and Justice. These are the main points of immigrant
and migrant contact with the state, and therefore the most likely to
require policy guidelines. Other departments dealing with immigrants –
such as Correctional Services, Defence, Health, Education and Welfare,
as well as their provincial counterparts – will also require investigation in
order to get a comprehensive picture account of current language policies
and practices. To this end, the report includes recommendations for
further research.
Two assumptions inform this report. Firstly, we assume that the
interests of structures like the Pan South African Labour Board
(PanSALB)1 as well as NGOs are distinct from the interests vying for
power within government and state structures. We therefore conclude
that various civil society groups and possibly the PanSALB will actively
defend the Constitution and advance a progressive and inclusive approach
to language policy that benefits everyone. In a country where language
has been used to divide and undermine certain political, social, economic and cultural interests, it would seem necessary for language policy
to become central in the elaboration of democracy and human rights.
Secondly, we assume that it is in the long term interests of the new
political order in South Africa to use sensible language planning to
maintain peace (by promoting tolerance of diversity), and prosperity (by
using linguistic resources effectively). It should be possible for nongovernmental interests to forge a consensus with government on the use
of language policy to promote and sustain democracy (through promotion of
diverse voices, in an inclusive and participatory political system).

1
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However, the research for this report provided a striking reminder
that few state officials have considered the impact of language policy
(and its absence) on broader issues of transformation. Although faced
daily with language capacity problems, and the visible manifestation of
contested uses of language, state officials interviewed tend not to see a
link between their immediate concerns and the role of language policy in
providing solutions in both the short and long term. Furthermore, senior
civil servants are not necessarily aware of the link between language
policy at departmental level, and national priorities of reconstruction
and development.
Administrative justice and state bureaucratic procedures concerning
migrants and immigrants are currently not informed by an explicit,
coherent language policy. In some cases there may be violations of
constitutionally guaranteed language rights, particularly in situations
involving detained persons where their rights, including the written
provision of reasons for negative administrative action, are not
adequately communicated; and in courts where inadequate language
facilitation discriminates against individuals on the basis of language and
place of origin.
Reasons for the lack of a coherent policy include:
• Absence of co-ordination between legislative and bureaucratic
decision-making on language issues;
• Inadequate understanding in most government departments of
the role and function of language policy;
• Poor co-ordination within and between departments on language
issues;
• Lack of consultation, negotiation and transparency in
decision-making within departments;
• Inadequate human resource management, including the
management of linguistic resources which exist within
departments;
• Avoidance of multilingual policy due to the current power
struggle between newly appointed, English speakers in the civil
service, and existing Afrikaans speakers;
• The weak capacity of African migrants and immigrants to
advocate on their own behalf; and
• Increasing xenophobia against, and exclusion of, African
immigrants, which is partially an expression of the ambiguity of
nation-building.
The nature of internal departmental policies and practice, including that
of language, directly impacts on public service delivery. The absence of
language policy in general contributes to the lack of policy regarding

2

language facilitation for immigrants. This contributes to an overall
governmental silence about the legitimate linguistic and cultural
presence of other Africans in South Africa. This silence has the
potential to obscure real and potential human rights abuses by
government, civil society and South African citizens. It is in the interests
of democracy and the integrity of the new Constitution to reach into the
silence and make apparent the presence and rights of speakers of
officially unacknowledged languages of African provenance.
The actions taken to make this policy area explicit and to ensure the
upholding of the Constitution for marginalised constituencies, can
contribute to making language policy and practice part of inclusive
democratic state building rather than exclusive nation- building.
Redress and correction of the current situation would provide an
opportunity to replace the idea of “language as a problem” with
“language as a resource”. Hence, immigrants’ linguistic and cultural
resources could be recognised as contributing to South African
reconstruction and development, and the multilingual abilities of civil
servants would be acknowledged, promoted and rewarded.
Owing to the complex power dynamics within the state bureaucracy,
it is necessary to assign particular responsibility within government and
state departments for redress and corrective action, and for organisations
of civil society to be made aware and become vigilant on the issue of
language access.

3
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INTRODUCTION

T

he new South African government is committed to
democratic nation-building. The country’s new rights-based
Constitution asserts that “South Africa belongs to all who
live in it, united in [their] diversity”.2 The rights and
entitlements guaranteed by the Constitution are extensively inclusive, and
based on the principles of “human dignity, equality and freedom”. Everyone
has the right to freedom and security of the person; to housing, health care,
social security and education; to access to information; to administrative
justice; and “to use the language...of their choice.” (authors’ emphasis).3
South Africa has expressly committed itself to an inclusive,
rights-based democracy, which recognises the plurality of racial, ethnic,
cultural and linguistic groups in South Africa. The current process of
nation-building raises the question of just how inclusive the normative,
legal, linguistic and cultural boundaries of the new South African nation
are to be.
Language rights are arguably the most important rights guaranteed by
the Constitution, as the protection of equality, justice, access to
information and state resources are largely dependent on communication
in languages in which people are competent. In keeping with
constitutionally guaranteed rights, all legislation and policy affecting
immigrants in South Africa arguably ought to be available in a language
and register which they can understand. All administrative processes to
which they may be subject, ought to be likewise facilitated.
These conditions are in keeping with the United Nations Declaration
on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in
which They Live. Article 3 States that “[e]very State shall make public its
national legislation or regulations affecting aliens”, and Article 5(f)
states that “[a]liens shall enjoy...[t]he right to retain their own language,
culture and tradition....”
Under apartheid, the boundaries of culture and language were largely
defined in terms of race. This was explicit in South Africa’s racially
exclusive immigration policy. Until 1986, any prospective immigrant had
to be “readily assimilable by the white inhabitants,” and not a threat to
“the language, culture or religion of any white ethnic group.”4 A more
inclusive immigration policy, which may reasonably have been expected
after 1994, has not yet materialised.5 On the contrary, the past two years
have seen an alarming increase in anti-immigrant sentiment among the
general public and some officials.
One explanation for the rise in xenophobia lies in the ambiguity of
South African nationalism. Emerging from a history of division, South
Africans face the challenge of forging a united nation. The one thing
4

they can all now acknowledge and share is citizenship. For some,
citizenship not only signifies who “we” are, but also designates “them”.6
Immigrants appear to have become the new “them”. They are portrayed
as a threat to social and economic security, rather than a threat to an as
yet unformulated national identity. However, it is quite possible that
nation-building will increasingly be driven by calls for the exclusion of
those who are not South African nationals.
The challenge for immigration policy-makers is not what to do about
“them out there”. The presence of immigrants within South Africa raises
the more immediate question of what to do about “them in here”. If
South Africa embraces a nationalistic project, resultant policies,
including those of language and immigration, are likely to be exclusive.
Conversely, a state-building project based on constitutional principles is
more likely to produce inclusive policy responses.
To ignore immigrants’ language rights is to erode a culture of human
rights and democracy. This silent threat to the legitimacy of the
Constitution requires the attention of those committed to preserving
peace, prosperity and democracy in South Africa. Although migrant
communities from other African countries are not powerless and
certainly constitute a substantial segment of the population in several
provinces, they have a weak advocacy infrastructure and lack a
recognised voice within the political system.

LANGUAGE AND NATION

T

wo processes are currently unfolding around language issues in
South Africa. The first is the construction of a new national
identity in the country. This identity is partially being
constructed by growing xenophobia and the “othering” of
foreigners, particularly people of colour. Some South African citizens
have begun to portray immigrants as fundamentally “non-South
African,” “foreign” or “alien”.
The derogatory term for foreigners, amakwerekwere supposedly
describes “the way they mumble in English”.7 Black South Africans who
were misidentified by local Alexandra residents as immigrants in
xenophobic attacks in January 1995 were deemed “too black to be South
African”.8 Economic cleavages are also beginning to designate insider
and outsider identities: in Mhala in Mpumalanga, for example,
Mozambicans provide cheap labour to South Africans to perform menial
tasks. “If one local asks another to perform such tasks, the response is
likely to be U nga ndzi endli Mupoti (or ‘Don’t treat me like a
Mozambican’).”9
Civil servants seem increasingly to assume that the rights of

5
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immigrants (particularly Africans and Asians) are not necessarily
protected by the Constitution, and that it is not necessary to provide
them with language services, available to English- or even Germanspeaking people.
The second process is the growing displacement of Afrikaans by
English as the administrative medium in state departments. This process
actually discourages multilingual policy development and practice. All
civil servants receive the message “report to your superior in English
only”. This weakens commitment to multilingualism, thereby fostering
the notion of an exclusive national identity. This identity is partially
characterised by a linguistic hierarchy with English at the top, Afrikaans
in the middle, African languages at the bottom, and immigrant African
languages, including those which are not recognised as official languages,
in a sub-class off the scale, and out of the realm of policy.10
South Africa’s eleven language policy attempts to link the needs of an
emerging elite and a mass popular constituency, in order to legitimise the
displacement of the old guard.11 It would therefore be unrealistic to
think that a power struggle to control the language of the state can be
avoided. Language is also a primary vehicle for accessing the state and
state resources. Insofar as immigration policy necessitates immigrants’
engagement with a number of state departments, issues of language rights
and policy are central.
A draft report of the Language Plan Task Group (LANGTAG)12 on
the civil service suggests that a language policy strategy for the public
service should have both internal and external objectives:
[T]he issue of language in the Public Service involves both
the use of language(s) for internal administration purposes,
which is directed at the functioning of the state machinery
(and does not directly impact on national life), and for
external communication purposes, that is, for public
consumption (which has a profound impact on civil society
at large). The latter involves communication not only with
the citizenry, but also with the international community.13
The Government of National Unity’s (GNU’s) language policy for
Public Service management agencies should therefore aim to (a) effect
good management and efficient administration, and (b) ensure client
satisfaction by providing equal access to available public services and
programmes through successful internal and external communication.
We would argue that these two policy areas, the internal and the
external, are inseparable. Janine Rauch, a representative of the
Secretariat for Safety and Security explicitly recognised this point when
she cogently pointed out that if people’s rights in general were not
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respected and guaranteed within the department, it was unreasonable to
expect civil servants to recognise and protect those of the public:
Internal rights issues are crucial for public service delivery.
We must fix up internal human resource management. Race
discrimination is the most obvious problem, but there are
others. We haven’t got our head around rights, how to
integrate internal rights with transformation and public
service change. The language issue doesn’t stand on its own.
It is part of service issues - the quality of service and
effective policing.14
According to Rauch, provincial commissioners are responsible for
building internal capacity in languages appropriate for particular
provinces. She claims that, to date, “transformation of the service has
been internally focused. There is no focus on how to deal with
externals”. Although she recognises the inextricable link between
internal policies and service delivery, she claims that “there is no link
between internal language policy and the question of language and
public access to the service”. She laments the state of the Training
Division, which she claims is “useless and immobile; badly managed and
under-prioritised”.
In the next section the often confused and contradictory opinions of
civil servants indicate the complex terrain that must be covered to
develop useful policy in this area.

THE RISE OF ENGLISH IN STATE DEPARTMENTS
Eliminating the vestiges of apartheid has required new internal
structures and a long-term plan to develop an equitable
balance among staff. The mission was struck by the
complacency of many long-term civil servants and their lack of
consciousness about the distortions which apartheid caused
and which persist. They appear to act under the mistaken
assumption that technical competence is the only qualification
for their tasks. For such staff, it will be necessary to engage in
active retraining for sensitivity and awareness in race, gender
and other human rights issues. The resistance which some
branches have shown to affirmative action hiring, as well,
misconstrues the importance of diversity. Affirmative action is
necessary not only to change the face of the departments and
make them more representative to the public, but to develop a
culture of inclusion within the departments themselves which
is necessary to the accomplishment of their tasks.15

7
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or decades, Afrikaans was the life-blood of the state bureaucracy.
It was both a symbol of political power, and an instrument of
bureaucratic efficiency. Many have accused the Afrikaners of a
linguistic arrogance which resulted in the exclusion of other
linguistic and cultural groups. However, it seems that English exclusivity
is in the process of replacing Afrikaans exclusivity. No one is arguing for
greater inclusion and access for speakers of the other nine official
languages.
A marked feature of post-1994 transformation in many departments is
the internal displacement of Afrikaans by English as the bureaucratic
language of choice. The Department of Home Affairs, for example,
recently decided to make English the official language of internal
communication.16 A similar decision seems imminent in the Department
of Safety and Security.
Brian van Niekerk, Senior Superintendent in the Department of
Safety and Security claims that Afrikaans-speaking bureaucrats “don’t
have a problem with the apparent demise of Afrikaans. It’s a practical
issue. Language policy and register must be based on what is easiest. We
must have a flat, basic form of English”.17 The dominance of English was
endorsed by a number of other interviewees as both a practical and
political project. Several see the rise of English as the dominant
bureaucratic language to be a progressive event that was the neutral
option in the face of diversity.
Many of the civil servants we interviewed were Afrikaans speakers.
Most actually thought that Afrikaans should be marginalised within the
public service in favour of English because English is a politically neutral
language and black people do not speak Afrikaans. Some felt that
speaking English shows goodwill to new (black) colleagues and that
English communication is more efficient.
English is increasingly seen by Afrikaners as the language of access to
employment opportunities, including those offered by the state. In
response,
white Afrikaner males are becoming more competent in
English, which they see as a currency for equal competition
for jobs. This allows them to compete with the black guys.
Whites are aware that they must improve their [English]
language skills, as employment opportunities become more
competitive.18
Other interviewees disagreed that English is necessarily the language
which most effectively meets the needs of state employees and the public
which they serve, stating that “more black people understand Afrikaans”.
However, this was disputed by another state official, who explained that

8

“many newly appointed black people in the bureaucracy can’t speak
Afrikaans – they speak English”. Another questioned whether the issue is
that black bureaucrats cannot – or will not – speak Afrikaans. One
pointed out that “many people in the Department from the previous
homelands speak English, not Afrikaans”. One concluded that:
English language policy may, for now, be the safe and
“politically correct” option, but it is not sustainable in the
long-term because of its elitism and failure to address real
needs.
Van Niekerk claims that as an Afrikaans speaker himself, the increasing
prioritisation of English within the department left him feeling linguistically
disadvantaged and less able to perform his job : “When English began
creeping in, I felt disadvantaged. I was not as competent in English as I was
in Afrikaans.”19 Other bureaucrats endorsed this sentiment, claiming that
English is not necessarily the language which most adequately meets the
practical linguistic needs of members of the bureaucracy.20
The efficiency of departments could be undermined by feelings of
political marginalisation and alienation among Afrikaners: “There is
panic inside the department: the political issue is around Afrikaans.
People are upset about [the demise of] Afrikaans.”21 Van Niekerk claims
that Afrikaners’ initial response to the ascendance of English was denial,
but that they were now “in a muddle stage”. In his view, there should not
be a language policy per se: “This language thing must sort itself out.
Enforcement causes hassles.”22 Whether or not Afrikaners are
comfortable with English, they could continue to resist its imposition for
political and ideological reasons. Such resistance is likely to impact
negatively on productivity and public service provision.
Dr Anthony Minnaar of the Department of Safety and Security
argues that “language policy is a political decision, and there are highranking black people in the police who only speak English”.23 Minnaar
refers to the dominance of English as “politically correct” in the sense
that it conforms to current perceptions about who should control the
state. This, of course, implies that language policy is informed not solely
by issues of linguistic competence and practicality, but of political
inclusion and exclusion. He claims that no-one wants to be seen as
overtly defending the use of Afrikaans because of its associations with
the past political system and with unresolved racism.
Those who would contest the marginalisation of Afrikaans are
therefore unlikely to do so “up front”. Rather, he suggests, “the survival
of Afrikaans is seen as being linked to the survival and promotion of
other African languages”. The strategy of the disaffected Afrikaner,
therefore, is to promote other languages as well as Afrikaans. Other

9
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respondents confirmed this, claiming that some Afrikaners respond to
the marginalisation of Afrikaans not by resisting the use of English, but
by promoting use of all of the other ten official languages:
The issue is presented as one of the dominance of English,
rather than as the marginalisation of Afrikaans. This is a
political strategy, in response to the political nature of the
issue of Afrikaans and Afrikaners in the bureaucracy...those
who promote or impose English language policy seem to be
blind to the practical and political implications. The
privileging of English doesn’t meet the needs of people on
the ground.24
However, the Department of Safety and Security apparently offers no
incentives or rewards for competency in African languages, although
many police, including white officers who are recruited from the rural
areas, have such skills: “The guys in these jobs [dealing with immigrants]
are good linguists, but they don’t get rewarded for their language skills.”25
Our research suggests that even as departments become more racially
inclusive, they remain linguistically exclusive. This is evidenced by the
growing replacement of Afrikaans by English as the dominant language
of state. The result is internal contestation over the position of Afrikaans
and Afrikaners within the bureaucracy. As the United Nations Centre
for Human Rights notes:
Departments are dominated overwhelmingly by appointees
from the apartheid period which, in practice, means
predominantly white Afrikaners. The Ministries, in
contrast, are headed by members of the ANC with the
exception of three IFP ministries. The contrast between the
two – ministries and departments – is dramatic and the
frequent tension that exists is not surprising. Although there
have been new appointments to all departments, the
ministers tend to be new to government and dependent on
the functioning bureaucracy. As a result, they have generally
refrained from radical changes. As one high level official
told the mission, if the bureaucracy becomes too
uncomfortable, the system becomes dysfunctional. “Until
now,” he said, “we have perhaps erred on the side of too
much comfort.”26
The issue is both practical and political, involving a struggle for control
between representatives of a new, black English-speaking elite and ancien
regime Afrikaans-speaking senior and middle level bureaucrats. Internal
issues of rights, and the unresolved status of Afrikaans and the Afrikaner
within the bureaucracy, constitute major blockages which undermine the
10

ability of departments to protect and guarantee the rights of the public
which they serve.
If one of the functions of the bureaucracy is to provide administrative
continuity in the face of political change, then departmental language
policies need to be well thought out, and their formulation needs to be
rational, inclusive, consultative, representative, accountable and
transparent.
Where, then, does the impetus for English come from? No-one is quite
sure. A number of respondents could not locate the source of decisions,
other than that they emanated from “very high up”. The South African
Communication Service (SACS) audit of the Department of Home Affairs
suggests serious internal communication problems on these and like
matters.27 Some 48.4% of personnel (of all ranks) indicating that they
received only limited information and 13.6% indicated that they received
no information from top management about the organisation. Some 65% of
head office personnel experienced top management as autocratic.
Within the Department of Safety and Security, Minnaar says,
“decisions are not made through consultation and negotiation, they are
imposed by decree and command. This is a major problem”.28 In some
cases committees are responsible for decision-making, although
respondents were not sure that they do anything more than rubber stamp
the preferences of senior officials. None of the consultative committees
appeared to involve State Language Services or LANGTAG. None
appeared to deal with substantive issues of inclusion and exclusion or
long term issues of peace, prosperity and democracy. In the case of Home
Affairs, it appears that a single bureaucrat had changed internal policy in
favour of English as he was unable or unwilling to read documents in
Afrikaans.

IMMIGRANTS AND LANGUAGE POLICY

T

his section provides an overview of language policy
initiatives, needs and shortfalls in the departments that deal
most directly with migrants and immigrants. The analysis is
far from exhaustive and may require correction for accuracy of
detail. It aims to provide a general impression of the current situation in
these departments.

DEPARTMENT OF HOME AFFAIRS
The Department of Home Affairs has taken an ad hoc approach to
language policy based on short term needs and untested assumptions,
without guiding principles or an understanding of multilingual
11
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administration. The result has been a shift to English only for internal
communication and no coherent plan for external communication.
No one is responsible for language policy within Home Affairs, other
than the Chief Directorate Administration in a general sense. The
departmental document on external language policy has barely been
changed since the new Constitution with section 1.5.1 referring to the
use of any of the official languages (ie eleven), and the subsequent
sections unchanged from the old Constitution and referring to both
official languages (English and Afrikaans).
The unco-ordinated character of policy is illustrated in two
departmental circulars issued by the Director-General’s office. The first
memo, in 1994, dealt with the rather innocuous subject of rubber stamps,
noting that in order to create effective communication between
departmental officials, other departments and members of the public, “it
was decided to use English as the common denominator”. The memo
advises that henceforth all rubber stamps should be produced in English.
A second circular refers to the success of the rubber stamp policy to
justify the request that officials henceforth:
make use of English as the common denominator. Manuals,
computer programmes, etc. will be adjusted to assist officials
in this regard. It follows that records of meetings and
internal discussions should also be kept in English.29
Hennie Meyer, the Chief of Communications, notes that English has
emerged as the common language within Home Affairs and is generally
considered to be a practical option. He emphasised that the adoption of
English was a consensual process amongst the staff. When pressed on
why multilingualism was seen as ineffective and unproductive, it emerged
that the problem was with reports and minutes being produced in
Afrikaans which senior officials were either unable or unwilling to read.30
Despite the drift towards English, Home Affairs requires extensive
multilingual capacity on the ground. In some cases this has resulted in a
planned approach to language facilitation (with good results); in others it
has led to frustrating and unresolved situations.
The use of interpreters in the Refugee Sub-Directorate, with training
and evaluation support from the United Nations High Commission on
Refugees (UNHCR), stands out as one of the best examples of language
access for non-South Africans. Although there are still problems with
the use of untrained and unqualified interpreters, generally all refugees
can be understood and sophisticated investigations and interviews can be
conducted with relative confidence.
Another good example of practical access occurred during the second
round of advertising of the 1996 SADC “amnesty”. The exemption

12

offered certain categories of other SADC citizens the opportunity to
apply for permanent residence in South Africa. By the time of the initial
deadline, the department had received an embarrassingly small number
of applications. The deadline was then extended to 30 November 1996
and the department embarked on a more systematic advertising and
dissemination campaign. The department conducted radio and TV
advertising in all the official South African languages, and translated a
flier on eligibility criteria into five African languages – Xitsonga,
Setswana, Sepedi, isiZulu and Sesotho. According to Meyer, the
department was constrained by time and resources. Xhosa, Venda,
Afrikaans, and Swazi were left out, on the assumption that these
languages were not used by SADC exemption applicants. The Director
of Migration later observed that:
the only non trans-boundary African language in South
Africa is Xhosa, so if South Africa implements its own
official language policy, it should cover most of the other
languages in the region.31
Our own analysis suggests that Tsonga, Zulu/Ndebele, Portuguese,
English, Southern Sotho and Tswana were the most common first
languages among the applicants. The translation and circulation of the
flyers appears to have been highly successful. Even in the rural areas,
knowledge of the amnesty was widespread.32 Given the potentially large
number of Mozambican applicants, the obvious language overlooked was
Portuguese. However, a local Portuguese newspaper took the initiative to
reprint the conditions of the exemption.
At Home Affairs offices where applicants congregated, translation
services were more ad hoc. The department hired a single Portuguesespeaking Angolan at the Market Street office in Johannesburg to provide
translation services. Other interpreters were brought in on an occasional
basis as required or, interestingly, supplied by the applicants themselves.
Under special circumstances such as the amnesty, observed the Director
of Migration, “the department does not take responsibility for
interpreting and the clients must provide their own”.33
The department’s relative success in providing language facilities for
asylum-seekers and disseminating information about the SADC
exemption process contrasts sharply with normal departmental practice.
The LANGTAG research indicated that there was a substantial
communication problem at the Market Street offices in Johannesburg
where no language translation facilities were available for visitors unable
to speak an official language.34 At the time, staff indicated their
frustration with having to deal with Portuguese and French speakers, and
increasingly with South East and East Asian visitors.

13
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The senior official at Market Street complained that his staff had
been “plagued” by language policy investigations.35 He remembered the
LANGTAG consultation taking up three days despite the fact that it was
all conducted in one day and took less than three hours including an
hour of observation. He was also dissatisfied with the lack of adequate
feedback from LANGTAG and the fact that the report on his department had gone to his superior and not back to Market Street directly.
Management attitudes at Market Street provide further evidence that
language (and language policy) is viewed more as an annoyance rather
than a resource to be understood and managed effectively.
The experience of Home Affairs highlights some of the features that
distinguish efficient and inefficient language facilitation by a
department:
• Efficiency is improved when there is external input and
monitoring (eg the UNHCR and the Refugee Subdirectorate);
• Language facilitation is more likely when someone is placed
specifically in charge of this function. In the case of the SADC
exemption, decisions were taken and evaluated primarily because
the Director of Communications took specific responsibility;
• Expert knowledge of language policy, language facilitation and
the needs/profile of the users is required; and
• Discrimination must be avoided. There are allegations that white
visitors to South Africa are processed effectively at Harrison Street,
whereas black migrants and visitors are sent to Market Street and do
not receive adequate access or client-orientated service.
The policy silence around issues of language as they pertain to the
interface between the state and migrants contrasts with the obvious
ability of migrants and police or Home Affairs officials to find some
linguistic middle ground. Although head office may not be able to find a
Swahili interpreter quickly, in practice, migrants and police officers enter
into a communicative relationships which allow for information to flow
where power relations permit. Thus, contrary to our expectations,
language resources do exist. Furthermore, language is not always the
barrier it is made out to be. When government officials do not want to
hear or understand migrants, miscommunication is conveniently
facilitated by the lack of policy.

DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND SECURITY
Within the Department of Safety and Security, language policy, in so far
as it exists within the department, is orientated to internal needs.36
Policy has been developed by a language task team, convened by Salomie
Reineke in the National Corporate Development sub-division. General
14

policy (as distinct from operational policy within SAPS) is initiated by
the civilian secretariat and referred to a policy forum, consisting of the
secretariat, the Minister and the Police Commissioner.37
The issue of foreign languages or languages required to work with
non-citizens is not currently a policy consideration, although its
implications have already led to a number of informal initiatives. During
the LANGTAG research, the head of one of the Aliens Internal Tracing
Units indicated that his staff were constrained by their inability to
communicate in French. He himself had taken the initiative to start
French lessons.38
The LANGTAG investigation identified three different and uncoordinated initiatives to teach French to police officers. Some police
officers expressed a preference for building Zulu second language capacity
rather than learning French, but a coherent plan or policy framework
was absent. Senior officers indicated that with the substantial increase in
foreign visitors and immigrants there is an increasing need for language
services. Informally, police officers who are competent in Tsonga and/or
Portuguese may get preference in immigration work.
One officer noted the increased demand on his staff to communicate
with speakers of languages from South, Southeast and East Asia.
Generally, interpreters are procured from the Department of Justice,
embassies, other foreigners, and family or friends of the detained person.
SAPS and Home Affairs sometimes share an interpreter to assist with
different aspects of an investigation or deportation. There was consensus
that increased training of interpreters is required, although whether this
should be a government or private responsibility was debatable.
Rauch raised a number of pertinent issues about language use inside
the department, including the need to recognise linguistic diversity and
encourage multilingual proficiency.39 A possible aim would be to have all
officers and staff proficient in two languages, and encourage them to
develop a third, whether foreign or local. She considered it to be in the
department’s interest to invest in language capacity building. This could
take the form of additional remuneration for multilingual personnel in
the police force, and the provision of incentives for learning additional
languages. There is definitely room for private sector assistance in
training programmes, which could include language acquisition.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Three senior SAPS staff and a Home Affairs deputy director all agreed
that the Department of Justice has prime responsibility for providing
interpreters. Prior to 1994, the Department of Justice was the only
ministry training and employing African language interpreters. These
15
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interpreters were required to have a matric exemption. The department
provides five week courses, focussing on legal issues and concepts, with
some attention to ethical issues.
Historically, black interpreters in the apartheid legal system were in a
difficult position. Under-trained and under-resourced, interpreters were
required to perform a variety of tasks including cultural interpreting,
mediating different legal systems (customary and Roman Dutch), and
sometimes actively assisting the court in cross-examining and
influencing judgements. Although the ethics and quality of interpreting
varied considerably, the entire interpreter profession acquired the
reputation of upholding racially discriminatory practices by the courts
and the legal system.
Currently, the Chief Interpreter’s register includes 78 languages
(including all 11 official languages). The register is apparently out of date
although the Chief Interpreter believes that his department can facilitate
more than 100 languages.40 His major concern is to improve the standard
of interpreting in the courts. In 1994, with the launch of the Joint
Interpreter Training Initiative (JITI) at the University of the Orange
Free State, the department’s Chief Interpreter and trainers, the white
administration and the interpreters union all recognised that the job
definition, training and working conditions of interpreters were
inadequate.41
Many foreign language interpreters have no formal training. Others
have the basic five week training but this is inadequate. Training usually
occurs after one year or more working in the courts (ie there is no
pre-training or screening). It is also difficult or impossible to test the
abilities or standard of foreign language interpreting in the courts. There
are, in addition, too few interpreters for the increasing work load,
particularly for courts outside Johannesburg and Pretoria. There is also
the ethical problem of having an interpreter involved in the
investigation process and then serving at the trial.
The inadequacy of foreign language interpreting and capacity is
illustrated by the following examples:
• In 1995, court proceedings in a case had to be delayed by six
months while a Swahili interpreter was located.42
• The courts have only six Shona interpreters. Five are resident in
Johannesburg and one in Pretoria. They work full time, although
they are hired as casual labour. They cannot serve all the required
cases at once, leading to regular postponements particularly in
outlying areas.43
• The Chief Interpreter is currently trying to locate a Chinyungwe
speaker. He may have a lead at the SABC of someone who is a
friend of a part-time Chewa interpreter who works there. The
16
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interpreter may not be a first language speaker, and is unlikely to
have legal or interpreting training.44
In 1995 an Amharic-speaking Ethiopian in detention was sent an
Arabic-speaking interpreter. Neither could understand the other.
After considerable delay, an Amharic speaker was located.
There are no interpreters available for Thai, Indonesian or
Malay. Only one interpreter is available for some SADC
languages, such as Herero. Interpreters working in ChiSena,
CiTonga, Lingala, Kwanyama, and numerous other SADC
languages are untrained.
There is a recurring problem in using South African
Tsonga-speaking interpreters for trials involving Mozambicans.
The languages are not really the same. The Mozambican variant
has a lot of Portuguese in it.

The new Constitution has had no impact on the quality of interpreting.
Rather more emphasis is placed on getting detainees before a magistrate
within the 48 hours stipulated in the Constitution. If the detainee speaks
one of South Africa’s official languages the hearing can proceed
normally. If the detainee speaks an official language minimally but not
adequately the magistrate is able to postpone the hearing pending the
availability of an interpreter. If the detainee is entirely able to
understand any official language, and no interpreter has been found in 48
hours, he or she is allowed to go free and charges are dropped. The
responsibility for finding an interpreter rests on the Chief Court
Interpreter.

DEPARTMENT OF ARTS, CULTURE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
The position of the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and
Technology (DACST) is an ambiguous one. Although the State
Language Services (SLS) is housed in the department, and SLS has
promoted multilingualism and greater policy coherence, its success with
other state departments is uneven. SAPS, for example, has made little or
no use of SLS. Home Affairs noted that it had ignored the DACST
Director-General’s memorandum on multilingualism. Home Affairs also
used the South African Communication Services (SACS) translation
services for the SADC amnesty publicity rather than National
Terminological Services (NTS) at DACST. The Chief Court Interpreter
in the Justice Department was not even aware of SLS
He suggested that SLS do more public relations work with
government departments.45
The most important initiative to date on language policy and
planning was the Language Plan Task Group (LANGTAG) investigation
17
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and report. LANGTAG was the first policy vehicle to acknowledge the
presence of African immigrants and migrants and their languages in
South Africa. However, with a change of minister and priorities,
LANGTAG’s recommendations appear to be on the back burner.
No-one seems to know whether SLS/NTS should be driving the
process of training and accrediting interpreters or whether this ought to
be the responsibility of another division or department. According to the
outgoing SLS Director, interpreting is beyond the jurisdiction of
DACST. He confirmed that his department was not promoting the
recognition of interpreters as a formal employment category with the
Public Service Commission. The commission confirmed that it only
recognises interpreters in the Justice Department.
SLS has also investigated the feasibility of a telephone interpreting
service, a concept which met with wide approval at the LANGTAG
consultative conference. SAPS staffs’ response to the idea was generally
positive, although they were unsure of who ought to provide training and
set qualifications for specialised work such as criminal investigations.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
Our research did not include the South African National Defence
Department (SANDF), although its staff play a significant role in border
patrols. However, the Language Service Directorate (LSD) of SANDF’s
Personnel Division was conducting a consultative forum on language use
in the Defence Force at the time our research was taking place.
The SANDF has produced the most comprehensive draft document
on language policy of any of the departments. The draft calls for a needsdriven approach that affirms constitutional principles while striving for
efficiency. The advent of a consultative forum with experts also indicates
an advanced level of organisation around language policy.
This preparedness stems from the LSD’s explicit responsibility to
assess needs and recommend policies. Although the Defence Force has
traditionally had different policies in different branches (the Navy
adopted English as its command language several decades ago) there is
some attempt to rationalise resources and formulate a coherent strategy.
The LSD’s mandate extends to foreign language capacity. The increased
likelihood of South African troops serving in Francophone Africa has
provided new impetus to the effort to identify human resources and
develop strategy.
The SANDF, like the SAPS and most other departments, is grappling
with the dilemma of Afrikaans. The language is an important resource
within the service, but is associated with the old regime. The need for
national reconciliation and inclusiveness is sidelining Afrikaans with the
18

basic issues unresolved. Although the need for dialogue on these issues
would seem paramount, the initial policy document hesitates at
addressing directly the questions of language, power and sustainable
language policy.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CO-ORDINATION
Throughout our interviews, civil servants expressed concern that an
eleven language policy was expensive and inefficient. Most officials
associated it with producing all written correspondence in 11 languages.
Departments were also clearly more concerned about internal communication than external communication and human resource management.
There was little or no concern for testing language needs, or
developing policy to link internal human resources with external or
internal (eg training) requirements. No serious attempts are underway to
build linguistic capacity in the civil service.
Co-ordination of line functions between state departments on
language issues is all but absent. There is no co-ordinated language policy
to facilitate internal communication among departments. Furthermore,
all state departmental employees we interviewed stressed the need for
interpreters to facilitate their communication with the public, but few
knew where to find them. The situation has absurd results. The Chief
Court Interpreter, for example, notes that he spends an inordinate
amount of time writing reports on the work of foreign interpreters for
Home Affairs so that he can keep them from being deported! This
process of repetitious and time-consuming report writing is necessary in
order to keep interpreters that Home Affairs itself wants to make use of,
in the country.
The almost total lack of co-ordination of language policy objectives
mitigates against any resolution of current problems in the system. The
transition process has brought with it a good deal of chaos, inexperience,
and exacerbated already weak inter-departmental communication. The
Chief of the Refugee Subdirectorate in the DHA informed us that in
1996 alone, Home Affairs lost over 600 years of experience from
retrenchments and voluntary retirement.46
The SANDF has suggested that there should be an
inter-departmental forum to co-ordinate language training and resource
allocation. This could also facilitate the sharing of ideas of policy
formulation and implementation. In particular, it would encourage the
Department of Education to consider the long term needs of the
government service. One interviewee suggested setting language capacity
targets for 10 to 20 years in the future and realising these through the
education system.47
19
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LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND NGO RESPONSES

E

xperience in other African countries suggests that organisations
of civil society often either supplement or complement the
functions of an under-resourced and over-extended state. A
number of NGOs in South Africa are addressing the issue of
human rights, including the rights of undocumented migrants, and are
facilitating people’s access to information, the protection and guarantee
of their rights, and their access to the state.
However, few, if any, are specifically addressing the language issue.
Sheena Duncan of the Black Sash concedes that “in assisting clients with
amnesty applications, and more generally, with interpreting the Aliens
Control Act, the Black Sash didn’t think about language issues”.48 She
believes that “in South Africa there’s always someone who can speak
English. People who speak English as well as the required African
language, feed the information back into the community”. If typical, such
an assumption, to the extent that it informs more general NGO practice
and makes services available only in English, is likely to inadvertently but
implicitly enforce the marginalisation of African language communities.
The message it conveys to immigrants is that they can choose exclusion
from, or assimilation into, anglophone South African society.
Other NGOs have provided human rights education to the
Department of Safety and Security at the station level, but language
issues were again apparently not an issue.49
The United Nations Centre for Human Rights was requested by the
South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alfred Nzo, to “undertake a
needs assessment survey with a view to providing technical co-operation
to the new government in the field of human rights”.50 The centre
assessed Safety and Security, Defence, Correctional Services, Land
affairs; Housing; Water; Education and Justice without addressing
language issues.
NGOs are involved in providing interpretation and translation
services to refugees and asylum-seekers although the resources for this are
limited. The South African Red Cross has become the primary service
provider at the instigation of the UNHCR. The social and legal
programme of the Red Cross offers refugees and asylum seekers legal
counselling, trauma counselling, a tracer service for family members,
assistance with employment and translation services. The various
independent refugee forums in various centres aim to provide various
services to refugees including provision of food and shelter, health care,
legal advocacy and language education and skills training. Assessing the
role of such refugee relief providers in the Durban area, one report notes
that organisations:
20

find themselves overburdening their reserves to
unacceptable levels and having to channel funds that were
originally intended for other purposes in order to furnish the
needs of their refugee programmes.51
Adequate language services are a likely victim of this financial squeeze.

(MIS)PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS

O

ne of the primary obstacles to new thinking and policy on
language rights and access for immigrants and non-citizens
is the prevalence of misleading assumptions concerning the
languages of immigrants. These inaccuracies may eventually
create national mythologies and prejudices, which in turn could
contribute to the stigmatisation of immigrants.
A selection of remarks and comments by officials during the research
illustrates the depth of misperception:
• 75% of Africa speaks French
• There is a Chinese alphabet that is used generally by East
Asians (explicitly Chinese, Taiwanese and Koreans)
• Nigerians are drug dealers, drug dealers speak French,
therefore Nigerians speak French. Police need to learn
French as a priority language
• International drug cartels conduct business in English
• West Africans speak French
A senior police officer observed that the police:
assume that people who can’t speak English or Afrikaans
must be from over the border. We establish that a person is a
foreigner if he can’t speak one of our languages.52

A mindset continues to exist which frames English and Afrikaans as the
two “official” South African languages.
Research conducted among immigrants in Winterveld suggests that
some immigrant children are denied access to education because the
language of instruction is Setswana, which many cannot speak or
understand.53 A similar situation exists with access to health care:
anyone who is not competent in Setswana is likely to be treated
discourteously by health care workers.
Equally disturbing were acts of misidentification of foreigners. Several
Ndebele-speaking women from Zimbabwe (who were also reasonably
competent in English) were introduced to us at Lindela Deportation

21

kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk

MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 4

kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk

SILENCED BY NATION-BUILDING: AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS & LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

Centre as Kenyans by a Zulu-speaking security guard.54 One possible
explanation for this misidentification, is that she wished to label these
young, dark-skinned, obviously poor women as “more foreign” than they
actually were.
Several Lindela staff also introduced a Korean couple as “Chinese”.
Although the staff are not proficient in a Chinese language or Korean,
their lack of interest in determining national identities and languages
was apparent. The couple themselves expressed their opinion that
European immigrants were treated differently from “Orientals” who, they
believe, are perceived by South Africans as very wealthy and welcome
only if able to invest large sums of money.
Migrants and immigrants are certainly not passive in the face of the
communication deficiencies of the South African state with whom they
have to deal. There is evidence of linguistic pre-selection influencing
migration. There may be a disproportionate number of migrants coming
from cross-border language groups (eg Tsonga, Sotho, Ndebele-Zulu
speakers). Some migrants from elsewhere, for example, undergo linguistic
preparation prior to entering South Africa. Many Mozambican
immigrants from the north and centre of that country apparently spend
time in southern Mozambique in order to learn some Tsonga (Changana)
before entering South Africa. Most of the deportees at the Lindela
Deportation Centre could communicate in one of South Africa’s official
languages, mostly in Tsonga, Zulu or English.
Evidence from Winterveld suggests that certain immigrant groups
may cease using their languages and assimilate into the surrounding
linguistic environment to decrease their visibility and stigmatisation.55
Although this may appear to resolve certain policy issues it sows the
seeds for later problems when issues of identity and consent have been
blurred by a hostile environment.
Another interesting example of immigrant linguistic strategies came
from the Korean couple at Lindela Deportation Centre. Neither partner
was confident to conduct negotiations in English, although both could
speak, read and write it. Their children, who are more fluent in English,
would accompany them to the Home Affairs offices, but they were also
accompanied by Afrikaans-speaking friends to assist with interpreting.
According to the couple, they would speak Korean to their children, who
would translate into English for their friends who would then negotiate
with the Home Affairs officials in Afrikaans.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THE PROBLEMS

T
•

•

he current political environment is not particularly
propitious for a constitutionally-grounded rethink of
language policy. Migrants are increasingly perceived as a
threat to the economic viability and political identity of
the new South Africa. This is despite the historical reality of
migration as a continuous and vital component of South Africa’s
economy and cultures. Foreigners are becoming an under-class
within South Africa. Their presence is necessary but unwelcome,
and they are in a constant state of vulnerability. Silence on the
big issues spills over into other arenas such as culture and
language. There is a cycle in which the denial of the foreign
under-class feeds a policy silence, which feeds the public and
bureaucratic denial of problems, which in turn provides fertile
ground for human and civil rights violations. This cycle of silence
and denial threatens the human rights culture espoused in the
Constitution.
Our research shows that within the new government, English is
being promoted and Afrikaans sidelined as the bureaucratic
language of choice. Owing to sensitivity over the perceived link
between Afrikaans and racism, Afrikaans speakers are loath to
complain about their marginalisation and trigger a debate about
multiculturalism, multilingualism and access. This situation
confuses race issues with larger issues of Africanisation
(linguistic, cultural and class) of the bureaucracy and access for
the majority of the population to services and resources. The
English-only trend in the bureaucracy means that the language
facilitation that could be developed to work with (and for)
immigrants and migrants is constrained in the current
environment.
Where government departments have problems communicating
with non-citizens, the situation is only resolved if there is some
kind of watch dog (eg a magistrate or the UNHCR). None of the
main government departments dealing with immigrants and
migrants has so far developed an approach to language
facilitation or capacity building. Where policy exists it is for
internal departmental communication and favours English while
discouraging multilingualism. The most serious issues of language
rights violations involve court proceedings where interpreters
may not be available, or are not qualified, and may not even have
23
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received any training. This prejudices speakers of foreign
languages, whether they are citizens, residents or illegally in
South Africa.
Typically, no one is responsible for language issues in most
departments, and no one has the mandate to co-ordinate
inter-departmental strategies. Most senior civil servants do not
understand the role and function of language policy. Moreover,
no one is sure what a multilingual and multicultural civil service
should look like.
Cases of successful language facilitation are there but isolated.
Resources such as SLS, NTS, court interpreters, the Foreign
Affairs language school, and others are under-utilised. State
Language Services and LANGTAG are unknown to the majority
of bureaucrats, and the vision promoted by these structures are
not understood or promoted by NGOs working in the field of
immigration.
The stigmatisation of foreigners is heightened by growing
nationalism. Admittedly, the situation facing immigrants and
migrants is not substantially different from that facing most rural
and less educated South Africans. When a Tanzanian detainee
reported that some police had beaten women in prison and called
them dogs (in English), she claimed that such treatment was not
confined to foreigners, but that South African citizens were
treated equally badly. On the other hand, there is prima facie
evidence that black immigrants and migrants are treated
substantially worse than their white counterparts, and that Asian
immigrants are treated somewhere between the two. This should
be a warning bell to the watchdogs of the Constitution.
These problems are mitigated somewhat by (a) the willingness of
foreigners to learn South African languages, (b) the fact that
some South African languages are shared with neighbouring
states, and (c) the high degree of multilingualism among lowranking state employees. Migrants are keenly aware of the price
to be paid for maintaining their identities, however. The absence
of policy by government and awareness by NGOs creates a strong
pressure for immigrants to assimilate, abandoning their languages
and culture-knowledge. Evidence abounds of immigrants (legal
and undocumented) adopting South African identities, or
avoiding speaking in their mother-tongue, out of fear of being
detected and identified as outsiders. One interviewee observed
that “Zimbabweans speak English because Shona gives them
away”.56

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
•

•

•

•

•

A greater sense of the inter-related character of key issues around
language policy research needs to be developed and to inform
strategies to resolve current problems. An important element in
any solution should be mediation and talking through of the
issues by interested parties, particularly those disadvantaged by
the current situation.
If multilingualism is undermined by the marginalisation of
Afrikaans by English-speaking elites, then the Afrikaans speakers
must be encouraged to talk about their perceptions, as must
African language speakers currently being excluded. The
resolution of that potential source of conflict will bring in its
wake a new mindset that will open up an awareness that language
can be a creative resource for governance.
A dialogue should be initiated with migrants and immigrants. As
with the debate over first language instruction in ex-DET
schools, immigrants should not be pushed into making decisions
about language without the options being on the table. Dialogue
has the advantage of educating people on both sides of the
conversation. Bureaucrats and policy makers need to understand
the concerns and experiences of the people who access
government services. Policy needs to be a living thing, constantly
renewed in the face of changing conditions.
The recommendations to PanSALB highlight the need for
responsibility to be assigned to particular civil servants, and for
watchdogs to be assigned to monitor implementation. Without
responsibility, there is not accountability. Without monitoring
and evaluation by independent groups, the power dynamics
inside the government will dominate priorities. Clear
communication and leadership can help affirm civil servants who
do have some understanding of language policy and practice.
The racist legacy of immigration policy (including linguistic
access) needs to be aggressively exposed and understood. A
poignant reminder of racism and linguistic discrimination in
South African immigration policy is exemplified by the presence
of the so-called Zanzibaris in KwaZulu-Natal.57 The Zanzibaris
were ex-slaves of Mozambican origin who came to South Africa
at the time of their emancipation in 1873. Under apartheid they
were reclassified four times, eventually being referred to as “Other
Asians” despite having never been in Asia. At no point have
their languages been recognised by the government, taught in
schools, played on radio. After 120 years in South Africa, and
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having survived as a distinct religious, ethnic and linguistic
community, this community is under the greatest threat to
disband in our new democracy. Their presence, and that of many
other dark-skinned immigrants is perceived as an affront to the
nation. Having been Other Asians, they, like millions of others
may now become Other Africans. Whereas the Zanzibaris
number only 10 000, Mozambicans and other undocumented
migrants from SADC number in the hundreds of thousands. Not
to accept this fact, and acknowledge their presence and rights, is
to tread a dangerous path, too similar to our recent past.
We also have a number of very specific recommendations for dealing
with the current situation identified in this report:
• The PanSALB should make immigrant and migrant language
issues more visible.
• A watchdog needs to be assigned to key contact points between
non-citizens and government.
• People in government, NGOs and non-citizens themselves need
to know what language rights exist and how to easily and
effectively take up a case of rights violations.
• Victims of language rights violations should know where to take
their complaints for investigation, and the information should be
publicised on this in government departments, through NGOs,
and to immigrant civil society structures.
• Promotion of language rights among foreign language users of
government services; including the rights of detained or arrested
persons, the right to an interpreter under certain conditions, the
right to receive in writing explanations for administrative action
that negatively affect individuals, etc.
• The PanSALB could facilitate an inter-departmental forum on
language policy and planning involving appropriate civil
servants, language experts and representatives of civil society.
Encourage workshops among civil servants on what language
policy involves, identifying their own needs and possible
solutions, linking this with the new Constitution, LANGTAG
and a resource-orientated approach to language diversity.
• Ministries need to locate responsibility for language policy in one
particular office within each respective department, at each level
of government.
• The PanSALB should seek high level political patronage for
implementation of the language clauses of the constitution and
LANGTAG.
• Conditions need to be created whereby all government
departments send memoranda, departmental circulars,
26
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consultative documents, draft reports and reports related to
language to PanSALB and SLS for comparison with the language
provisions of the Constitution.
There needs to be support for advertising of government and
non-government language expertise (eg State Language Services,
SACS, Foreign Affairs Language School, etc) and promoting
awareness of language issues amongst NGOs working with
migrants and training police in diversity awareness and
community policing.
The PanSALB could convene an inter-departmental meeting on
interpreter training and provision, including foreign language
issues and promote specific responsibility in government for
training, evaluating and accrediting interpreters

FUTURE INFORMATION NEEDS
To our knowledge, this report is the first of its kind dealing with
immigrant and migrant language issues in South Africa. Much basic
information, such as the size of the language communities or the
frequency of occurrences of language problems in government offices, is
simply not available. More importantly, the views, needs, attitudes of
immigrant and migrant communities need to be canvassed and stimulated.
In this regard, the PanSALB or other organisations should
commission or encourage investigation of the following:
• A more accurate statistical picture of immigrant language
communities in South Africa, starting with a more detailed
analysis of the last two censuses. What are the language attitudes
of immigrant and migrant communities? What are the language
attitudes of host communities? Is there language intolerance or
tolerance? Are immigrants assimilating linguistically and
culturally? To what degree is assimilation voluntary or forced?
• The attitudes of state officials towards developing a human rights
culture in the civil service, with specific reference to language
rights – especially those officials responsible for the
implementation of immigration policy.
• Inter- and intra-departmental decision-making processes: who
makes decisions? On the basis of what criteria and assumptions?
What is the validity of such assumptions and criteria? In whose
perceived interests are such decisions made? How consultative,
transparent and accountable are these decisions? Do they
conform to the spirit and the letter of overall legislation affecting
the departments? Do they conform to the spirit of a human rights
culture, as specified in the Constitution?
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•

•

The degree of awareness of human resource management in
national departments to build appropriate multilingual capacity,
and to put in place mechanisms to identify and reward
multilingual capacity in individuals and departments.
Provincial departmental capacity and political dynamics
surrounding language issues, with specific reference to the
implementation of immigration policy. Given that the provinces
of Gauteng, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu/Natal seem to be most
affected by the influx of immigrants, these provinces should form
the focus of such a study. The departments which ought to be
investigated are those of Home Affairs, Correctional Services,
Safety and Security, Justice and Defence.
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Rauch, Janine: Secretariat, Ministry of Safety and Security, 5 December 1996.
Schravesande, Claude: Director, Refugee Affairs, Department of Home
Affairs, 5 December 1996.
van Niekerk, Brian: National Commander: Sea Borders Border Control and
Policing, Department of Safety and Security, 9 December 1996.
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